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ABSTRACT 
Sense perception is certainly a conscious way in which we relate to the world, but 
thought tends to occur unconsciously. While some thinkers argue for the certainty 
of certain mental states, others think that these mental states cannot provide sure 
foundations for certain interpretations of mental states which belong to other 
individuals. Consequently, it has been argued that due to the nature of the 
problem of consciousness, results obtained from empirical tests tend to lack the 
capacity to provide intrinsic road maps for future studies and understanding of 
consciousness. While adopting the traditional reconstructive methods of critical 
analysis in philosophy, the study analysed various attempts made towards 
developing test measures and theories aimed at providing operational definitions 
and a direction towards the understanding of the study of consciousness. Most 
tests and theories studied were identified as capable of providing ample evidence 
for the proof of consciousness in certain living and nonliving organisms. Some 
flaws in these tests however, made laudable efforts in the study of consciousness 
amount to near nothing, thereby condemning thinkers to endless debates. The 
study recommends that thinkers of the 21
st
 century resolve to adopting synthetics 
and pluralistic approaches in the formulation of theories as the road to future 
progress in the study of consciousness.  
 
Key Words: Consciousness, Empirical, Mental States, Pluralistic, Synthetic, 
Theories. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Some theorists up hold that sense perception is a conscious way in which we relate to the world 
while thought tends to occupy unconsciously. The mind with all its functioning in thinking 
seems to be a different kind of thing from consciousness. It is not as if there is a subjective state 
occurring when one deliberates, it is not as if there is something it is like to deliberate or produce 
a thought which one can be aware of. But when someone steps on my hand for instance, I feel 
pain. This is because there is something that it is like to be in pain and I have certainly been 
aware of the experience before. On the other hand, there is something it is like to eat a plat of 
chocolate cake. Further more, I can tell the difference between being in pain and eating a plate of 
chocolate cake; the second is pleasurable while the first is not. 
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The whole idea seems pleasurable when I apply it to myself and the experiences of my thoughts, 
deliberations and perceptions. The whole scenario becomes problematic when we try to claim 
consciousness for someone other than our self. I might know that I feel pain when I am stepped 
upon and that I feel good when I am eating a plate of chocolate cake, what bearing does these 
personal experiences have on you? Perhaps for all I know, you may have the sensation of eating 
chocolate cake when I step on your hand and perhaps, when you eat cake you feel pain and 
wince. The real question here is “can anyone from the first person perspective, know about 
someone else’s consciousness?  Science can explain how the brain works but it can not account 
for or explain how you feel. If and when we treat other people as if we are certain about their 
consciousness, we will be making misguided assumptions 
A renowned researcher who had written extensively in the area of consciousness is expected to 
know a lot about consciousness and how it relates with other people. But the truth is that, all the 
knowledge about consciousness may never really arm us with the knowledge about what is going 
on inside the head of the researcher nor can he claim to know what is inside the mind of the other 
person. This dilemma in philosophy is generally known as the problem of other minds 
(Chalmers, 1997). That one has the knowledge of what is going on in his mind is no premise 
from where such persons can claim to know or have any proper way of having access to the 
activities in the mind of others. The truth is, we may never known for sure whether the people in 
question have minds or not. 
Some studies (Chalmers, 1997) have advanced three steps towards the direction of ascertaining 
the conscious states of individuals. The first person-subjective experience for Chalmers has been 
conceived as the starting point for determining who has consciousness. (I can observe my own 
consciousness) as captured in the thoughts of Rene Descartes, Corgito ergo sum “I think 
therefore I am”. Here I can observe my own awareness. The second, you a different person from 
myself can verify that you are conscious by the applications and adoption of the same processes 
which aided my own confirmation. The hard and third step is the point where I can only assume 
that you are conscious. This is because I cannot know for certain that you are. When we make 
assumptions that other people are conscious, we do so based on indirect evidence: the fact that 
we human beings have many things in common, our brains and evolutionary processes for 
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instance are remarkably the same, the DNA pattern etc, are all the same. With so much in 
common, why not have a consciousness that is common to all as well?     
This study therefore is a critical analysis of studies and attempts to capture the meaning and 
essence of consciousness among individuals, animals and inanimate objects with the view to 
ascertaining how this reality influence the wellbeing and development of the individual in his 
environment. The study also considered critically, certain step (tests) and theories which have 
been taken and proposed in the past to test or ascertain the degree of consciousness in animate 
and inanimate beings.   
2. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY AND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS  
Explaining the true nature of consciousness for thinkers toady is one of the most important and 
perplexing areas of philosophy. Consciousness is a subject of much research in philosophy of 
mind, psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience and artificial 
intelligence. There are broadly two competing school of thought in the philosophy of mind 
which have done extensive study towards understanding the nature of consciousness. These two 
schools of thought are captured in the dualist and the materialist theories propounded by them. 
Studies (Butler, 1863), (Shieber, 2004) conducted by both schools of thought tend to raise more 
questions than answers. Questions in this class include: is there a relationship between 
consciousness and science? What are the neutral correlates of consciousness? To what extent is 
the human mind different from that of the animal? Can any machine, given the right 
programming, become conscious? (Marcus, 2002) 
The history of Western philosophy contains a rich collection of literature which goes back to the 
time of ancient philosophers on subjects such as the human nature, the soul and the mind. 
Sophisticate works on the nature of consciousness in this regard, have been found in the works of 
Plato’s most famous students, Aristotle, (Caston, 2002:715-815). The works of Rene Descartes 
in the early modern era however, placed the subject of consciousness and the relationship it has 
with the mind and the body on the centre stage. For Descartes, he argued that the mind was a 
nonphysical substance different from the body. He also did not believe that conscious mental 
states also exists (Descartes, 2008). G. W. Leibniz was also known to have believed in the 
immaterial nature of mental substances which he called “monads”. He also importantly tried to 
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distinguish between perception and apperception, that is (outer-directed consciousness and self 
consciousness) Gennaro (1999).  
The most important and detailed theory of mind is associated with the works of Immanuel Kant. 
His main work: A Critique to Pure Reason captures to a large extent, his studies on the nature of 
consciousness and the mind body relationship. Kant had thought that an adequate account of 
phenomenal consciousness involved far more that what his predecessors were willing to accept 
as regards the nature of consciousness. He believed that there are mental states which are 
presupposed in the conscious experience. Consequently, Kant presented an elaborate theory to 
capture what these structures are. These positions correlated with the claims of Leibniz who saw 
the need to postulate the existence of unconscious mental states and mechanisms in order to 
provide an adequate theory of mind. Kicher, (1990) and Brook, (1994).  
Apart from the attacks and banishment which the study of consciousness suffered in the hands of 
behaviouralist psychologist (Skinner, 1953), others from psychology were known to be deeply 
interested with  the study of consciousness and the various methods proposed for investigating it 
and how it affects the mind. Other notable thinkers whose works had advanced studies on this 
subject include: Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and the works of Sigmund Freud. The 
works of Freud brought about the near universal acceptance of the existence of unconscious 
mental start and processes.  
Let us note that the few names mentions above did not have much scientific knowledge about the 
workings of the brain in detail. The advancement we now have today is attributed to the recent 
studies in neuropsychologist. We have reason to believe that present research in this area is 
partly responsible for the unprecedented interdisciplinary advances made in the areas of 
consciousness since the 1980’s. Consequently, several journals have been devoted to its study for 
example: Consciousness and Cognition, Journal of Consciousness Studies, and Psyche. There is 
also an entire book series dedicated to the study of consciousness: Advances in Consciousness 
Research, published by John Benjamins. Others who have notable works in small introductory 
text include: Kim, (1996), Gennaro (1996b), Block et al. (1997), Seager (1999), Chalmers 
(2002), to mention but a few.  
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3. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Consciousness have been defined in various ways; first as a subjective experience, as an 
awareness, the ability to experience “feelings”, wakefulness, the understanding of the concept 
“self”, or the executive control system of the mind (Fathering, 1992). It is also an umbrella term 
that may also refer to a verity of mental phenomena. (Van Gulick, 2004). Although human 
beings realize what everyday experiences are, consciousness refuses to be defined. 
Consequently, philosopher notes (Searle 2005) that the following deductions can be made:  
1. Consciousness is a state or condition of being conscious. 
2. Consciousness is a sense of one’s personal or collective identity, including the attitudes, 
beliefs, and sensitivities held by or considered characteristic of an individual group. 
3. A special kind of awareness or sensitivity: class consciousness, race consciousness 
4. The kind of alertness or concern for a particular issue or situation: a movement aid at 
raising the general public’s consciousness of social injustice. 
These standard definitions shall guide our study in this text. 
3.1.The Oxford Companion to the Body (Oxford Companion, 2000) captures the twentieth-
century British Psychologist; Stuart Sutherland who once defined consciousness as:  
… a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it 
does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it. 
Consciousness is indeed hard to define, but most people have an intuitive idea about 
what it is. It encompasses two different concepts: the notion of a self and the feeling 
of which the self is aware, especially qualia – our raw sensory experience. 
 
3.2.Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia (Britannica 2004) captures consciousness as:   
The quality or state of being aware, as applied to the lower animals, consciousness 
refers to the capacity for sensation and usually volition. In higher animals this 
capacity may also include thinking and motion. In human beings consciousness is 
understood to include “meta-awareness”, an awareness that one is aware. The term 
also broadly refers to the upper level of mental life of which the person is aware, as 
contrasted with unconscious processes. Levels of consciousness (e.g., attention vs 
sleep) are correlated with patterns of electrical activities in the brain (brain waves).     
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3.3.The Home Library Health Psychoanalysis Dictionary (HLP Dictionary, 2004). Records 
shows that this dictionary, in an attempt to define consciousness, made great defence to 
most of Freud’s ideas (Freud, 1900a) where he made the following remarks:  
In psychology, consciousness is the subjects of immediate apprehension of mental 
activity. Although Freud thought that conscious processes are “the same as the 
consciousness of the philosopher and of every day opinion” and “a fact without 
parallel, which defiles all explanation or description” He argued that they could not 
be considered the “essence” of mental life. Rather consciousness has a fugitive 
quality and does not “form unbroken sequences which are complete in themselves” 
(p. 157). “The physical, whatever its nature may be, is in itself unconscious and 
probably similar in kind to all other natural processes of which we have obtained 
knowledge” (p. 283) Freud however still stressed that consciousness still plays an 
important role, indeed it is “the one light which illuminates our path and leads us 
through the darkness of mental life” (p. 286). 
The work of the psychoanalysis, as Freud saw it is “translating unconscious processes into 
conscious ones and thus filling in the gaps in conscious perception” (HLP Dictionary, 2004:286). 
Consciousness from this perspective is the qualitative perception of information arising both 
from the external world and from the internal world: an external world that is unknowable to 
itself and to which we have access only via subjective elements collected by our sense organs 
and an internal world that consists of unconscious mental processes and what we are aware of 
solely through sensations of pressure / displeasure and revived memories. In Freud’s on wards, 
“A person own body, and above all its surface, is a place from which both external and internal 
perceptions may spring. (HLP Dictionary, 2004:25). 
4. PHILOSOPHIC AND SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS 
The hard problem of consciousness formulated by Chalmers in 1996 deals with the issue of how 
to explain a state of phenomenal consciousness in terms of the neurological basis (Dennett, 
2004:375). Access Consciousness (A- consciousness) is the phenomenon whereby information in 
our mind is accessible for verbal report, reasoning and the control of behaviour. So when we 
perceive, information about what we perceive is often access conscious, when we remember 
information about the past, such as something learnt in the past, it is often access conscious. In 
Chalmers’ opinion, access consciousness is less mysterious than phenomenal consciousness. 
This is why it is believed to pose one of the easy problems of consciousness.   
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Phenomenal Consciousness on the other hand is simply the consciousness associated with 
experience (Block 2004). It is moving, coloured forms, sound, sensations, emotions and feelings 
with our bodies and responses at the centre. These experiences considered independently of any 
impact on behaviour are called Qualia. The hard problem of consciousness as formulated by 
David Chalmers in 1966 deals with the issue of “how to explain a state of phenomenal 
consciousness in terms of its neurological basis (Dennett, 2004:375). 
Philosophical responses to the subject of consciousness from thinkers such as Malebranche, 
Thomas Reid, John Locke, David Hume and Immanuel Kant all vary.  Descartes and 
Malebranche for instance agreed that human beings where composed mainly of two elements: 
Body and Mind and that conscious experience resided in the latter. David Hume and Immanuel 
Kant also differed from Descartes in that they avoided mentioning a place from which 
experience is viewed.  Other philosophers such as George Berkeley have proposed that the 
content of consciences are an aspect of mind and do not necessarily involve matter at all. This is 
a type of idealism. Yet other such as Leibniz, have considered that each point in the universe is 
endowed with conscious content. This is a form of Panpsychism. Panpsychism is the belief that 
all matter, including rocks for example, is sentient or conscious.  
Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience under the scientific approach portray how 
consciousness as a research topic was strongly discouraged by main stream scholars because of 
the concerns of validations of both primary and secondary data. Today modern investigations 
into the subject of consciousness are based on psychological statistical studies and case studies of 
consciousness states. Early discoveries made in this area revealed that the mind is a complex 
structure derived from various localized functions that are bound together with a unitary 
awareness. 
Consciousness and Experimental Philosophy: A new approach has attempted to combine the 
methodology of cognitive psychology and traditional philosophy to understand consciousness. 
These researches have taken place in the field of experimental philosophy which seeks to use 
empirical methods (like conducting experiments to test how ordinary non-experts think) to 
inform philosophical discursions (Knobe, 2004). The main aim behind this kind of philosophical 
research on consciousness has been to try to get a better grasp on how people ordinarily 
understand consciousness. For instance, work by Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz suggest that 
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people may have two different ways of understanding minds generally (Joshua Knobe and Jesse 
Prinz, 2008). Other group of thinkers have argued that there is actually no such phenomenon as 
consciousness. (Sytsma, (2009). 
5. TEST FOR CONSCIOUSNESS 
The fact that there has not been a clear cut definition of consciousness and the fact that there is 
no empirical measure that exists to test its presence, most thinkers have argued, is as a result of 
the problem of consciousness. This general problem of consciousness they believe, has made 
empirical test intrinsically impossible. This notwithstanding, several test have been developed 
which attempts to provide operational definitions to consciousness. Some of these tests have 
been extended in the area of determining whether machines and non human animals can 
demonstrate through certain behaviours, by passing certain tests, be elevated to the class of the 
conscious. We shall in this section of the study consider a few of the tests which top the chart in 
the study of consciousness.  
5.1.The Turing Test 
The Turing test, most often than not, has been conceived as a test for consciousness, or some 
kind of behavioural tests for the presence of mind, thought or intelligence in simple minded 
entities. The test (Turing Test) is named after a computer scientist Alan Turing who was the first 
to design the test. It is actually a test designed to proof whether computers could satisfy the 
requirement which will allows individuals brand them with the quality of “intelligence” 
consequently, the test have often been cited in discussions of artificial intelligence. The test is 
simply based on “the limitation Game”. A human conducting the experiment tries via the use of 
a computer keyboards, communicates with two others, one a computer and the other, an 
individual who is presumed conscious. The mode of communications among the trio will be 
without voice such that none of the participants will know the person communicating at a point 
in time. If at the end of the conversation, the human is unable identify who in particular made 
which comment or contribution, the computer is at this stage presumed to have passed the test 
(Turing test) thereby certifying the operational definition for intelligence and consciences.  
Let us note that this test has generated a great deal of philosophical debate. Daniel Dennett and 
Douglas Hofstadter have argued that anything capable of passing the test should qualify as 
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conscious. (Dennett & Hofstadter, 1985). On the other hand, David Chalmers and other have 
argued that since philosophical zombies could pass the same test, it still does not qualify them to 
the class of the “intelligent” or the “conscious”. Others have considered the very questions 
“whether machines can think or partake in the quality called intelligence” a fallacious one which 
shouldn’t have come up in the first place. To them the same questions about the computers 
intelligence or consciousness is equivalent to asking “can submarines swim? 
5.2.The Chinese Room Test 
Philosopher John Searle is known to have developed the thought experiment, The Chinese room 
argument which was solely designed to show the flaws within the Turing test. (Searle, 1980). In 
this experiment, Searle asked the reader to imagine a non Chinese speaker in a room filled with 
Chinese symbols and a rule book to guide the none Chinese speaking person with the response 
he will need to make to the questions which will be passed on to him via a slot. The person is 
expected to respond by looking at the slot and with the aid of those Chinese symbols he is 
expected to respond to the questions with correct replies from the rule book on the Chinese 
language already at his disposal. Now based purely on the input and output operations, the 
person in the Chinese room gives a clear understanding of the Chinese language. The truth 
however is that the person in the Chinese room understands no Chinese at all. He is only able to 
respond correctly because of the corresponding symbols which he has at his disposal. This 
argument has been the subject of many philosophical debates since the argument was first 
proposed in 1980, consequently, volumes have been written on the topic alone. 
For want of space, we may not be able to discuss the Delay Test and the Mirror Test which are 
avenues designed in the past to test the existence of conscious mental states in man and other non 
human elements. 
 
6.  THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Irrespective of the potency inherent in the test discussed above, it is clear from the forgoing 
analysis that while some of the tests considered above in this study give ample reasons to infer 
consciousness in the test subjects under review, the same test when view from another 
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perspective, gives convincing reasons to reconsider the initially held position on the subject 
under review. The argument made to affirm consciousness or intelligence in the Turing test was 
flowed in the Chinese room test. These tests therefore failed to offer the much desired platform 
to understand the intrinsic workings of sense perception. 
 The problem of consciousness in the field of psychology and philosophy becomes an equally 
divers project for the 21sst century researcher who must find ways of explaining the phenomena 
which abounds in his every day endeavour. Not only do many aspects of mind count as 
conscious in some sense, each is also opened to various respects in which it might be explained 
or modelled. Understanding consciousness involves a multiplicity, not only of explanada, but 
also of questions that the pose and the sort of answers which they require. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, the relevant questions can be gathered under three crude rubrics as What, How, 
and the Why. 
The main focus of the three questions is directed respectively at describing the features of 
consciousness, explaining its underling basis or cause and explaining its role or value. Thinkers 
believe that the division among the tree are artificial therefore in practice, the answer one gives 
to each will depend it part, with what one says about the other questions. One cannot for example 
adequately describe the “what” question and describe the main features of consciousness without 
the “why” issues of its functional role in the system whose operations it affects. Nor could one 
explain how the relevant sort of consciousness might rise from non-conscious processes unless 
one has a clear account of just what features had to be realized to count as producing it. Those 
caveats notwithstanding, the three different questions provide us with the platform for 
articulating the explanatory process of particular theories or models of consciousness.  
7. THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
While thinkers press further towards offering explanations to the “What, How and Why” 
questions of consciousness, theories of consciousness have been formulated directed at capturing 
the intricate nature of the subject, however, studies reveal that not all theories of consciousness 
say the something. They vary not only in specific sort, but also in their theoretical aims. The 
largest division of most theories reviewed for this study tends to fall between two main 
categories: the metaphysical theories which aims at locating consciousness in the overall 
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ontological scheme of reality and more specific theories which aims at offering in some detail, 
the nature, role and feature of consciousness. 
7.1.Metaphysical Theories 
General metaphysical theories tend to offer answers to the conscious versions of the mind body 
problem. Questions in this class include: what is the ontological status of consciousness relative 
to the world of physical realities? Attempts made towards responding to these questions have 
resulted to the birthing dualists and physicalists theories of consciousness.  
7.1.1.  Dualist theories  
Proponents of the Dualist theories hold the view that the world consist of two fundamental 
entities such as mind and matter. Psychologically, the view holds that mind and body function 
separately without any form of interchange. In this wise, dualist theories regard at least some 
aspect of consciousness as falling outside the realm of the physical. This in turn has birthed more 
specific theories from the dualist school each explicating specific forms of thoughts in the dualist 
school with regards to the problem of consciousness. The further specific areas include: 
Substance Dualism, Property Dualism, Fundamental Property Dualism, Emergent Property 
Dualism, Neutral Monist Property Dualism, Panpsychism.  
The effort to address the problem of consciousness has evidently given rise to an array of 
theories each trying to capture certain specific. Such theories therefore face the dilemma of 
providing answers to the hard problem of consciousness. They end up proposing a new theory or 
identifying another problem at the new steps taken towards addressing the problem. In all, a 
verity of argument have been given in favour of the dualist and other anti physicalists theories of 
consciousness which aims at reaching or making anti-physical conclusions about the ontology of 
consciousness from the apparent limits on our ability to fully understand the qualitative aspects 
of he conscious experiences through third person physical accounts of the brain processes 
(Jackson, 1982:127-136), (Jackson, 1986:291-295). 
Other arguments for dualism have been made on more empirical grounds such as those that 
appeal to supposed causal groups in the chains of physical causation in the brain (Eccles & 
Popper, 1977) or those based on alleged anomalies in the temporal order of conscious awareness 
13 
 
(Libet, 1982:563-570). The problems remains that dualist arguments of both sort have been 
much disputed by physicalists (Churchland, 1983:156-181), Denneet and Kinsbourne, 1992:187-
247). 
7.1.2. Physicalist theories of consciousness:   
 At this point, it is important to note that most metaphysical theories of consciousness are 
versions of physicalism of one familiar sort or another. Eliminativist theories for instance 
reductively deny the existence of consciousness or at least, the existence of some of its 
commonly accepted sorts of features. The radical eliminativists  rejects the very notion of 
consciousness as muddled or wrongheaded and claim that the conscious /no conscious distinction 
fails to cut mental reality at its joints (Wilkes, 1984:223-43) and (Wilkies, 1988). They generally 
regard the idea of consciousness as off target to merit eliminations and replacement y other 
concepts and distinctions more reflective of the true nature of mind (Churcland 1983:80-95). 
Most eliminativists are more qualified in their negative assessment. Rather than reject the notion 
out rightly, they take issue only with some of the prominent features that are commonly thought 
to involve issues such as qualia, (Carruthers, 2000) the self conscious, (Denneet, 1992) or the so 
called Cartesian Theatre where the temporal sequence of conscious experience gets internally 
projected. (Denneet and Kinsbourne, 1992:187-257). Moe modest eliminativist, like Denneet, 
thus typically combine their qualified denials with a positive theory of those aspects of 
consciousness they take as real such as the multiple draft model. Other similar theories in this 
class include: Identity theory, Type-type identity theory, Functionalist theories, and Non 
reductive physicalism theory. In sum, the issues arising under the notion of consciousness 
remains under debate leading to yet more theories. 
7.2.Specific Theories of Consciousness  
Although there are many general metaphysical / ontological theories of consciousness, the lists 
of specific detailed theories about its specific nature are even longer and more divers. No brief 
survey could be close to comprehensive, however, six main types of theories were considered for 
review in this study. The study in this section could help indicate the basic rang of options: 
higher order theories, representational theories, cognitive theories, neutral theories, quantum 
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theories and nonphysical theories. For lack of space we shall only discuss two of such specific 
theories. 
7.2.1. Repersentationalist Theory   
Almost all the theories of consciousness regard it as having representational features, but so 
called representationalist theory are defined by the stronger view that its representationalist 
feature exhaust its mental feature (Harman 1999). According to the representationalists’, 
conscious mental states have no properties other than their representational properties. Thus two 
conscious or experimental states that share all their representational properties will not differ in 
any mental respects. The exact force of the claim depend on how one interprets the idea of being 
“representationally” the same for which there are many plausible alternative criteria. Many  other 
arguments has however,  been made for and against representationalism such as those concerning 
perception in different sense modalities of one and the same state of affairs – seeing and feeling 
the same cube- which might seem to involve mental differences distinct from how the relevant 
state represent the world to be. (Peacock, 1983). In each case both studies can muster strong 
intuitions and argumentative ingenuity. Lively debate continues.  
7.2.2. Cognitive theories 
Philosophers and psychologists have in time past, offered models that were aimed at explaining 
consciousness in terms of cognitive processes. The most important philosophical example is the 
multiple draft models (MDM) of consciousness advanced by Dennett (1991). This theory 
combines the representationalist model with a higher-order theory but does so in a way that 
varies interestingly with the more standard versions of either. The MDM includes many 
distinctive but interrelated features. 
The name of this theory reflects the facts that at any given moment, content fixation of many 
sorts are occurring throughout the brain. What makes most of these content conscious is not that 
they occur in a privileged spatial mode or formant, all of which the MDM denies. It is rather 
what Dennett calls” cerebral celebrity” i.e. the degree to which a given content influence the 
development of other contents throughout the brain, especially with regards to how those effects 
are manifest in the reports and behaviours that the person makes in response to various probes 
that might indicate there conscious state. 
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Dennetts MDM has been highly influential but has also drawn criticism especially from those 
who find it insufficiently realist in its view of consciousness and at best insufficient in achieving 
its stated goal to fully explain it. (Dretske, 1994:41-58) Many of its critics acknowledge the 
insight and value of the MDM but deny that there are no real facts of consciousness other than 
those captured by it (Rosenthal, 1994:319-350), (Van Gulick, 1994:443-456), (Akins, 1996:1-
43). 
8. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDTIONS 
In concluding this section, it appears that a comprehensive understanding of consciousness will 
likely require theories of many types. One might usefully and without contradiction, accept a 
diversity of models that each in their own way, aim at respectively explaining the physical, 
neutral, cognitive, functional, representational, and high- other aspects of consciousness. There is 
unlikely to be any single theoretical perspective that suffices for explaining all the features of 
consciousness that we wish to understand. Thus a synthetics and pluralistic approach may 
provide the best road to future progress in the study of consciousness.  
Psychologists, thinkers and researchers in the area of rural development need to understand that 
awareness and sense perceptions in the rural and urban areas different owing to various factors 
prevailing in the areas under focus. The wellbeing of the rural and urban dwellers in this 21
st
 
century can be achieved if researchers adopt the synthetic and pluralistic approach to the study of 
persons and groups in the area under focus. 
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